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STARE DECISIS AND THE SUPREME COURT(S):
WHAT STATES CAN LEARN FROM GAMBLE
Zachary B. Pohlman*
INTRODUCTION
In the October 2019 Term, the Supreme Court has been asked to overrule at least nine of its prior decisions.1 Supreme Court litigants may be
more emboldened to seek such a holding given the Court’s recent willingness to reconsider its precedents2—a trend that has not gone unnoticed by
the legal academy3 nor by the Justices themselves.4 These overrulings prove
that stare decisis—the legal maxim that implores judges to “let the decision
stand”5—is a prudential limitation, not an absolute rule.6 The Court’s recent
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in
Economics, Philosophy, and Theology, Rockhurst University, 2018. I would like to thank
Professor Randy Kozel, Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski, and Timothy Bradley for their
valuable comments and feedback. I would also like to thank my colleagues on the
Notre Dame Law Review for their scrupulous edits. Finally, thank you to my wife, Julia, my
parents, and my family for their endless love and support. All errors are my own.
1 Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: A New Term with Plenty of Hype, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/empirical-scotus-a-new-term-withplenty-of-hype/.
2 See, e.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019) (overruling Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985)); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (overruling Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)); Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977)).
3 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV.
157, 227 (2018); Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, Preserving the Law’s Coherence: Citizens
United v. FEC and Stare Decisis, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 39, 52 (2016).
4 See, e.g., Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Just last month, when the
Court overturned another longstanding precedent, Justice Breyer penned a dissent. He
wrote of the dangers of reversing legal course ‘only because five Members of a later Court’
decide that an earlier ruling was incorrect. He concluded: ‘Today’s decision can only
cause one to wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.’ Well, that didn’t take long.
Now one may wonder yet again.” (citations omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 139 S. Ct.
at 1506 (Breyer, J., dissenting))).
5 “‘Stare decisis’ is short for stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means ‘stand by the
thing decided and do not disturb the calm.’” Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due
Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2003) (quoting James C. Rehnquist, Note, The
Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66
1731
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reexamination of settled cases has sparked a renewed interest in exploring
the contours of this judicially enforced doctrine at both the federal and state
levels: When exactly should a precedent be overturned?
The Supreme Court grappled with this question in Gamble v. United
States, in which it revisited its longstanding “separate sovereignty exception”
to the Double Jeopardy Clause.7 Justice Thomas voted with the majority to
uphold the doctrine but wrote separately to expound his own views on the
role that stare decisis ought to play in the Court’s judicial decisionmaking.8
Rooted in history and tradition, his concurrence offers both a scathing critique of the Court’s current application of stare decisis and a detailed
account of Justice Thomas’s own textually grounded approach to precedent.9
While Justice Thomas’s concurrence is understandably aimed at the
Supreme Court, the current literature on stare decisis is likewise focused on
federal law.10 Given their comparative caseloads—the Supreme Court hears
roughly eighty cases per year,11 while 75,586 cases were filed with state
supreme courts in 2016 alone12—treatment of precedent at the state level
deserves greater doctrinal development. This Note attempts to advance that
discussion by proposing new stare decisis considerations for state courts of
last resort.
While almost all questions before the Supreme Court require statutory
or constitutional interpretation, state courts of last resort occupy a unique
place in the American judicial landscape. As common-law courts, state
supreme courts are empowered to develop common-law doctrines in addition to interpreting democratically enacted texts. This Note argues that
these two distinct state court functions—interpretation of statutes and constitutions, and common-law judging—call for two distinct approaches to stare
decisis, a distinction that is often muddied in practice. Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Gamble provides the framework for each approach, a framework
B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986)); see also Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(translating stare decisis as “to stand by things decided”).
6 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command . . . .”). Throughout this Note, “stare decisis” is used to refer to its “horizontal”
effects, not its “vertical” effects—meaning “a court’s obligation to follow its own precedent,
rather than its obligation to follow the precedent of a superior court.” Barrett, supra note
5, at 1015.
7 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963–64 (2019).
8 Id. at 1980–81 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 1981–89.
10 But see infra text accompanying notes 133–51 (discussing state-specific approaches
to stare decisis).
11 The Supreme Court at Work, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
courtatwork.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (noting also that “the Court typically disposes
of about 100 or more [additional] cases without plenary review”).
12 COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
DIGEST: 2016 DATA 19 (2018), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
CSP/National-Overview-2016/SCCD_2016.ashx.
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based on the genesis and development of stare decisis from its English common-law roots.
Specifically, this Note argues that even if the Supreme Court does not
accept Justice Thomas’s approach, state supreme courts should when deciding state statutory and constitutional questions. The distinct nature of state
constitutions, the state legislative process, and state legislative power in general call for a textually grounded approach to stare decisis of the kind Justice
Thomas proposed in his Gamble concurrence. Conversely, this Note argues
that state supreme courts should adhere to traditional stare decisis formulations when resolving common-law disputes because the doctrine of stare decisis itself developed at common law and has greater legal and practical
significance in the common-law context.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I explores the doctrine of stare
decisis by reviewing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gamble, its application of stare decisis in that case, and Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Part II
highlights some basic differences between federal and state courts and
explores the state court doctrine of methodological stare decisis as a way to
promote consistent treatment of precedent at the state court level. Finally,
Part III encourages state supreme courts to adopt Justice Thomas’s text-based
theory of stare decisis for questions of state constitutional and statutory interpretation but proposes an approach that is informed by but not beholden to
the one advanced by Justice Thomas when state supreme courts employ stare
decisis in their common-law capacities.
I. STARE DECISIS

IN

JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

Stare decisis is “a foundation stone of the rule of law.”13 Indeed, long
before the Constitution was ratified, Aristotle gave his imprimatur to the
practice, teaching that like cases should be treated alike.14 Yet the rule is not
absolute,15 raising two questions: When and why does a court depart from
the “foundation” that is stare decisis? In considering these questions, this
Part first explains the Court’s decision in Gamble, which serves as an illustrative application of classic stare decisis principles. It then turns to Justice
Thomas’s concurrence, which explores the common-law roots that underlie
stare decisis and operates as a valuable guide to forwarding a fresh approach
to this increasingly relevant debate.
A. Gamble v. United States
In November 2015, Terance Gamble was pulled over for a damaged
headlight.16 During the stop, officers found a 9 mm handgun, which Gam13 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014).
14 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542–43 (1982) (citing
ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA bk. V, at 1131a–b (W. D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1925) (c. 350 B.C.E.)).
15 See supra note 2.
16 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019).
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ble, having previously been convicted of a “crime of violence,” was barred
from possessing under Alabama and U.S. law.17 Gamble was subsequently
charged with and pleaded guilty to violating Alabama’s felon-in-possession
statute.18
Shortly thereafter, Gamble was indicted by federal prosecutors for the
same instance of possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it
unlawful for convicted felons “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.”19 After the federal district court denied Gamble’s motion to dismiss,
Gamble pleaded guilty to the federal charge but retained his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to dismiss.20 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s decision.21
Gamble’s sole argument in his motion to dismiss and on appeal was that
his successive prosecutions by state and federal authorities violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which ensures that “[n]o
person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb.”22 Gamble argued that his state conviction and federal indictment involved “the same offence” under the Fifth Amendment and that his
successive prosecutions were therefore unconstitutional.23 The lower courts
were bound to rule against Gamble under decades of Supreme Court precedent consistently recognizing that “two offences ‘are not the “same offence”’
for double jeopardy purposes if ‘prosecuted by different sovereigns.’”24 Put
another way, “a crime under one sovereign’s laws is not ‘the same offense’ as
a crime under the laws of another sovereign.”25 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address one specific issue: Should this “dual-sovereignty” doctrine be overturned?26
The Court had good reason to consider the question again. Three years
prior, in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,27 Justice Ginsburg—joined by Justice
Thomas—questioned the Court’s continued adherence to the dual-sover17 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a) (2019); see also id.
§ 13A-11-70(2) (defining “crime of violence” to include robbery).
18 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.
19 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
20 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.
21 United States v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (mem.), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.
23 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.
24 Id. (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985)); see also infra Section I.B
(explaining the 170 years of precedent affirming the dual-sovereignty doctrine).
25 Id.
26 Id. The Court assumed, as did the parties, “that the state and federal offenses at
issue here satisfy the other criteria for being the ‘same offence’ under [the Blockburger
test].” Id. at 1964 n.1 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
27 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016). That case involved successive prosecutions of the same
offense by Puerto Rico and the United States, and the Court held that such successive
prosecutions are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause “because the oldest roots of Puerto
Rico’s power to prosecute lie in federal soil.” Id. at 1868.
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eignty doctrine as applied to states, arguing for its reexamination “in a future
case in which a defendant faces successive prosecutions by parts of the whole
USA.”28 Gamble was that case.
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito began by examining the text of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. The Fifth Amendment protects against successive
prosecutions “‘for the same offence,’ not for the same conduct.”29 In other
words, for an act to constitute an “offence,” a law must be violated.30 And
because only a sovereign can enact a law, “where there are two sovereigns,
there are two laws, and two ‘offences.’”31 This syllogistic, textual analysis
strongly cut against Gamble. Yet Gamble argued that the Court’s prior interpretations of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which largely tracked Justice
Alito’s textual analysis, departed from the original understanding of the
Clause and that the time for overturning those interpretations had come.32
Proof of the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, while
slightly ambiguous, still lent support to the dual-sovereignty doctrine.
Neither Gamble nor the Court could find a reported pre–Fifth Amendment
case that barred a successive prosecution by either an American or British
court when the defendant had been convicted or acquitted by a foreign sovereign.33 The Court likewise found other contemporaneous cases and treatises advanced by Gamble unconvincing.34
B.

Stare Decisis and Gamble

In addition to this uphill historical battle, for Gamble, “stare decisis [was]
another obstacle.”35 The Court’s explicit stare decisis discussion in Gamble
serves as an archetypal recitation and application of the long-adhered-to doctrine. The dual-sovereignty precedent was clear and its history slightly murkier. Had the time come for its overturning? Justice Alito began the Court’s
stare decisis analysis by reciting the oft-quoted language of Payne v. Tennessee,
which explained that stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
28 Id. at 1877 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
29 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1965 (quoting Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
30 Id. (citing 2 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 167 (London, A.
Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792) (defining “offence” as “an act committed against law, or
omitted where the law requires it”)).
31 Id. (citing Grady, 495 U.S. at 529 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 13, 17 (1852)).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1970.
34 Id. at 1970–78. The Court also considered and rejected Gamble’s alternative arguments that prior Supreme Court decisions rejected the dual-sovereignty doctrine, that
incorporation necessitated reversal of the dual-sovereignty doctrine, and that the relatively
recent proliferation of federal criminal law is a fact warranting a structural change that
should eradicate the dual-sovereignty doctrine. Id. at 1977–80.
35 Id. at 1969.
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process.”36 Thus, stare decisis fundamentally rests on three policy preferences: consistency, reliance, and judicial integrity.37
“Of course,” Justice Alito reminded, “it is also important to be right.”38
While getting the case “right” is surely a chief concern of the Justices, the
weight that a precedent is afforded, at least doctrinally, depends on the legal
question it resolved. The Court has long adhered to the notion that both
theoretically and practically, it is more important for its constitutional interpretations to be “right” than it is for its statutory interpretations. Theoretically, if the Court incorrectly interprets a statute, Congress could “override
[that] error[ ] by ordinary legislation.”39 Congressional silence, conversely,
signals congressional acquiescence in the Court’s interpretation.40 While an
incorrect constitutional interpretation could in theory be overturned by constitutional amendment,41 as a practical matter—given the arduous amendment process and historically rare recourse to Article V42—the Supreme
Court itself is de facto the only governmental body that can correct its erroneous constitutional pronouncements.43 This bifurcation of the weight of
statutory and constitutional precedent at the federal level, widely accepted in
the legal academy and by the Court itself, does not, however, enjoy universal
acceptance.44
Nevertheless, in constitutional cases like Gamble, “a departure from precedent ‘demands special justification.’”45 The Court required that more
36 Id. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
37 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it ‘is
a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’”
(quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))).
38 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1969.
39 Id.
40 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
71–78 (1988). But see Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 323–27 (2005) (explaining an alternative view that separation of
powers, rather than congressional acquiescence, justifies a heightened stare decisis standard for statutory interpretations).
41 And the Amendments Clause has been invoked to do just this. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 79 (2011) (“Just as Dred
Scott’s racist result was overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment, so Minor’s sexist result
was overruled by the Nineteenth Amendment.” (footnote omitted)). Moreover, Congress
cannot, via legislation, overturn a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
42 Since the passage of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the Constitution has only been
amended seventeen times in the last 228 years. See U.S. CONST. amends. XI–XXVII.
43 See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1,
19–20 (2011); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1367 (1988) (noting that theories of heightened stare decisis for statutory interpretations
rest in part upon practical considerations as well).
44 See infra note 85 and accompanying text. For a discussion of both sides of this
debate, see generally Kevin M. Stack, The Inference from Authority to Interpretive Method in
Constitutional and Statutory Domains, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1667 (2017).
45 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)); see also Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the
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than “ambiguous historical evidence” be presented before “flatly overrul[ing]
a number of major decisions.”46 And Justice Alito posited that as a case’s
“antiquity” grows, so too does the case for adhering to it.47
The Court, accepting Gamble’s invitation, then reexamined a number of
its precedents. The survey revealed an unbroken record of the Court’s reaffirming of the dual-sovereignty doctrine. The reasoning behind that line of
cases was based largely upon the aforementioned textual clues and the different interests that two sovereigns may have in punishing the same criminal
act.48 The cases spanned back as far as 1847 and had been reaffirmed as
recently as 2016.49 Thus, given that the earliest antebellum case on point was
announced over 170 years ago, Gamble faced a stringent burden of proof
with regard to the evidence he needed to muster to convince the Court to
abandon a doctrine that it had historically affirmed without exception.
The somewhat ambiguous original meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause in this context, bolstered by nearly two centuries of precedent, proved
to be too great an obstacle to overcome. In a 7–2 decision, the Court reaffirmed its dual-sovereignty doctrine and affirmed Gamble’s federal conviction.50 The duality that Gamble highlights—the “settled versus right”
Role of Normative Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2206–09 (2014) (arguing that popular sovereignty, as a normative principle, should guide applications of stare decisis).
46 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1969 (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
47 Id. (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009)).
48 See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852) (explaining that an
assault on a U.S. Marshal offends the United States by “hindering” the “execution of legal
process” and a state by “breach[ing]” the “peace of the State”); United States v. Marigold,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 569 (1850) (“[T]he same act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offence against both the State and
Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by
either, as appropriate to its character in reference to each.”); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
410, 435 (1847) (“[O]ffences falling within the competency of different authorities to
restrain or punish them would not properly be subjected to the consequences which those
authorities might ordain and affix to their perpetration.”). This “different interest” justification is especially enlightened by considering, as the Court did, successive prosecutions by
the United States and by a foreign country, when jurisdiction is warranted by two international sovereigns. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967 (listing many reasons the United States may
want to prosecute criminal acts abroad, which include crimes committed against American
nationals abroad, crimes committed by American nationals abroad, distrust of a foreign
country’s legal system, and national security and foreign relations interests).
49 See Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1966–67; supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text; see also
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (reasoning that a single act can constitute two
distinct offenses); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 193–96 (1959) (holding that
double jeopardy does not prevent federal and state prosecutions based on the same underlying acts); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131–32 (1959) (same); Westfall v. United
States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927) (same); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 314 (1926)
(same); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (same).
50 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1963.
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problem of stare decisis—is an ever-existing tension in appellate court
decisionmaking.51
C.

Justice Thomas, Gamble, and Stare Decisis

Justice Thomas discerns no tension between confronting incorrectly settled precedent and his constitutional obligation to decide a case correctly.
He concurred in Gamble but wrote separately “to address the proper role of
the doctrine of stare decisis.”52 His thesis is simple: the modern stare decisis
doctrine is not consistent with the Court’s judicial duty “because it elevates
demonstrably erroneous decisions . . . over the text of the Constitution and
other duly enacted federal law.”53 This Section explores and elaborates
upon Justice Thomas’s critique of and subsequent proposal to remedy the
Court’s current stare decisis doctrine.
Justice Thomas begins by observing that in the federal system, the courts
alone are vested with the “judicial power,” which by all accounts obliges federal courts to faithfully interpret the Constitution and federal law.54 That
power is simply “to say what the law is” when a “case” or “controversy” comes
before a federal court.55 For Justice Thomas, two truths emerge from this
traditional understanding of the judicial power. First, it encompasses neither
“force” (executive power) nor “will” (legislative power).56 And second, it
implies a duty to correctly ascertain the meaning of the law.57 This understanding of the judicial power is derived from the judicial function at common law. The common law’s application of stare decisis is therefore
instructive for federal courts, which apply the doctrine in their own
decisionmaking.
Turning to Blackstone’s Commentaries, Justice Thomas explains that at
common law judges were duty bound to apply precedent. Common law was
custom inscribed, such that the principles articulated by the judges were
“seen as principles that had been discovered rather than new laws that were
being made.”58 As such, “‘precedents and rules must be followed, unless
51 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). For a
thorough discussion of the intricacies of this tension and normative proposals for rectifying the gap between the two, see generally RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017).
52 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1982; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
55 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1982 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
56 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1983 (quoting 3–4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35, at 129 (Paul A.
Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988)).
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flatly absurd or unjust’ because a judge must issue judgments ‘according to
the known laws and customs of the land’ and not ‘according to his private
sentiments’ or ‘own private judgment.’”59 Nonetheless, common-law judges
could have—and should have—rejected precedent when it was contrary to
“divine law,” for a judge “may mistake the law.”60 Justice Thomas argues that
this objective approach to judging, which on occasion implored common-law
jurists to consider the veracity of prior decisions, supports the American
understanding that the judicial power requires judges to decide cases and
controversies without extrajudicial policy preferences influencing their legal
decisionmaking.61
Justice Thomas’s historical claim is further bolstered by the English jurisprudence contemporaneous to the Founding. The common law operated
under the “declaratory theory,” whereby the law was thought to have a “Platonic or ideal existence.”62 Lord Coke explained that “all causes [should] be
measured by the golden and streight metwand of the law, and not to the
incertain and crooked cord of discretion.”63 When judges departed from
this ideal, later courts were free to correct the error. Thus, under the declaratory theory, common-law courts faced the same conundrum that plagues the
Supreme Court today: Get the decision “right” or apply “settled” (but incorrect) precedent? As the common law evolved, however, the declaratory theory largely became a legal fiction, with judges believing they had a “duty to
articulate some justification for setting aside the evidence of the law found in
prior decisions.”64 One exception did persist though: “[I]f it be found that
the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that
such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law.”65
Moreover, a brief survey of the English caselaw shows both the rigor with
which judges deferred to stare decisis as well as their occasional willingness to
depart from it. For example, in Braimer v. Bethune, Lord Gillies warned that
“[i]f we depart from [stare decisis], the law, in place of possessing certainty
or stability, would be shaken to the foundation.”66 And it was candidly stated
in another case that “stare decisis is a very good maxim.”67 Stare decisis was
decisively the rule, not the exception, as the resolute language with which the
doctrine was defended shows.68 Yet the rule, consistent with the observations
59 Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69–70).
60 Id. (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *70–71).
61 Id.
62 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 660 (1999).
63 EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 41
(London, E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1644).
64 Lee, supra note 62, at 661.
65 Id. at 662 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *70).
66 Braimer v. Bethune (1839) 1 D 383, 391 (Scot.).
67 Parker v. Drew (1754) 96 Eng. Rep. 935, 936; 1 Keny. 114, 117.
68 See, e.g., Bishop of London v. Ffytche (1801) 102 Eng. Rep. 188, 191; 1 East 487, 495
(“The rule stare decisis is one of the most sacred in the law . . . .”); The King v. Inhabitants
of Saint Mary (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1365, 1366; 8 T.R. 236, 239 (“[I]t is of great impor-
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above, was not absolute. The Court of King’s Bench once held that stare
decisis “is not always to be adhered to; and [the court] must be allowed . . . to
depart from what was holden” when confronted with an erroneous decision.69 And indeed, Blackstone’s Commentaries supports the dichotomy that
emerges from the caselaw. As one commentator observed, “Blackstone’s
venerable statements on the law of precedent . . . seem to chart a compromise course between the classic adoption of the declaratory theory and a
strict notion of stare decisis.”70 This tension, which values both stability and
objective truth seeking, supports the legitimacy of the common law by establishing clear expectations for potential litigants while being just flexible
enough to evolve when a prior decision is no longer (or never was) tenable.
But common-law judging differs from federal judging in important ways.
Most saliently, Justice Thomas posits that because federal courts do not (generally) make common law71 but rather interpret and apply only written law,72
stare decisis does not operate in the same way in the American federal system
that it did at common law.73 The role of a federal judge is thus “modest”: to
“interpret and apply written law to the facts of particular cases.”74 Combined
with the fundamental assumption that written laws have an objective and
ascertainable meaning, Justice Thomas believes that “there are right and
wrong answers to legal questions.”75 Thus, if a prior decision incorrectly
interpreted a written law, a court reviewing that decision must decide
tance that decided cases should be adhered to; and on this subject in particular I applaud
the rule stare decisis.”); Ringer v. Churchill (1840) 2 D 307, 324 (Scot.) (“I am strongly
impressed with the importance of the judicial maxim, stare decisis; and, in adopting the view
which I have formed of this case, I am satisfied that I do not trench upon any one of the
decisions referred to. Whether all these decisions were well founded or not, I shall not
even presume to offer an opinion. It is enough for me that there they are, a series rerum
judicatarum, which are not now to be the subject of question or revision.”). There was,
however, variation among common-law judges as to whether they believed stare decisis
allowed for review of the rationale, in contrast to simply the holding, of a prior decision.
Compare Menzies v. Murdoch (1841) 4 D 257, 262 (Scot.) (“I certainly agree that we cannot
overturn the decisions which have been referred to, although I cannot conceive what was
the ratio for these decisions, except the maxim, stare decisis.”), with Evans v. George (1823)
147 Eng. Rep. 660, 679; 12 Price 76, 139 (“[I]t would be a departure from the dignity of
this Court to consider ourselves bound by the single decision of a contemporaneous
authority, which we cannot but see was founded on only one doubtful case in point . . . .”).
69 Rex v. Inhabitants of St. Botolph (1755) 96 Eng. Rep. 851, 852; Sayer 198, 200; see
also Mutrie v. Haldane’s Trustees (1844) 6 D 1045, 1071 (Scot.) (observing that there are
matters where “we are bound to bend our minds to the duty of deciding according to the
truth”).
70 Lee, supra note 62, at 662.
71 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“There is no federal general common law.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938))).
72 But see Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 384, 405–21 (1964).
73 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984.
74 Id.
75 Id. (quoting Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996)).
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between one of two options: affirm the (incorrectly decided) precedent
under stare decisis principles or reject the precedent and decide the case
correctly.
Justice Thomas unabashedly prefers the latter. In his view, “if the Court
encounters a decision that is demonstrably erroneous—i.e., one that is not a
permissible interpretation of the text—the Court should correct the error,
regardless of whether other factors support overruling the precedent.”76 Justice Thomas’s approach to stare decisis thus differs from the modern formulation of the doctrine; the Court recently acknowledged that “[r]especting
stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.”77 The modern formulation, Justice Thomas warns, permits the Court to disregard the supremacy of
the Constitution; its text should be favored over precedents interpreting it.
In this way, Justice Thomas’s approach reflects the common-law conception
of stare decisis. Whereas Justice Thomas measures the correctness of a prior
decision by its fit with the text of the instrument under review, judges at
common law reviewed prior decisions for their consistency with the general
law. In each situation, whether to abide by precedent depends upon some
objectively discernable source of law that reflects the pre- and postpositivist
legal theories at play: general law and text, respectively. Justice Thomas additionally argues that faithfulness to the modern formulation usurps the legislative function because affirming erroneous interpretations is not law deciding
based on the interpretation of a text but lawmaking by the Court itself.78
Prior decisions are not, however, to be completely ignored under Justice
Thomas’s formulation. Precedent is still relevant to judicial decisionmaking
when it is not demonstrably erroneous.79 Justice Thomas allows that the
Court may uphold an incorrect decision out of respect for stare decisis “but
only when traditional tools of legal interpretation show that the earlier decision adopted a textually permissible interpretation of the law.”80 If jurists
undertake a textually constrained approach to interpreting a statute or constitution but disagree about the correctness of an interpretation,81 or if the
text and history are too ambiguous to support only one correct interpreta76 Id.
77 Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
78 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984.
79 Id. at 1986 (“Although precedent does not supersede the original meaning of a
legal text, it may remain relevant when it is not demonstrably erroneous. As discussed, the
‘judicial Power’ requires the Court to clarify and settle—or, as Madison and Hamilton put
it, to ‘liquidate’—the meaning of written laws.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Of course, even under Justice Thomas’s view,
precedent is “relevant” even when it is demonstrably erroneous. The Court cannot overturn a demonstrably erroneous decision unless it first confronts said precedent.
80 Id. at 1984.
81 Id. at 1986 (observing that Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia did not always agree on
what the history revealed of the original public meaning of the Constitution).
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tion using an originalist methodology,82 the (arguably incorrect) precedent
can stand. Faithful interpretations of ambiguous texts that fall within this
“range of indeterminacy” are the only ones, Justice Thomas argues, that may
“but need not” be affirmed under stare decisis as such, and they ought to be
upheld even if a later court disagrees with the textually permissible
interpretation.83
Additionally, Justice Thomas disavows the idea that constitutional and
statutory interpretations ought to be afforded differing precedential weight
for stare decisis purposes. Finding that arguments in favor of their distinct
treatment are based on the practical challenges of correcting erroneous constitutional holdings, not on strictly legal grounds, Justice Thomas emphasizes
that “our judicial duty is to apply the law to the facts of the case, regardless of
how easy it is for the law to change.”84 And he moreover argues that even if
congressional silence signaled Congress’s acquiescence in the Court’s interpretation, making law through judicial fiat would contravene the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses of Article I.85
Lastly, Justice Thomas attacks the Court’s current application of stare
decisis as “policy-driven, ‘arbitrary discretion.’”86 Whatever “uncertainty”
would result were the Court to adopt Justice Thomas’s view in its entirety,
Justice Thomas argues that such a move would be significantly less uncertain
than the multifactor balancing test currently favored.87 Rethinking stare
decisis as requiring a foundation in the text being interpreted would also, he
opines, reduce the Court’s tendency to invoke the doctrine to defend its
“least defensible” decisions.88
*

*

*

In sum, Justice Thomas offers his colleagues a candid solution to the
stare decisis debate: “When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent,
my rule is simple: We should not follow it.”89
82 Id. at 1987 (noting that the historical arguments in Gamble were by themselves
inconclusive).
83 Id. at 1984–86. For greater discussion on what makes a precedent “demonstrably
erroneous,” see Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1, 5–8 (2001) (analogizing the inquiry to the Chevron “permissibility” analysis to narrow when a precedent falls outside the “range of indeterminacy” and is demonstrably
erroneous).
84 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1987. I advocate an approach that is slightly less formal when it
comes to stare decisis and the practicability of legislative change at the state level. See infra
Section III.A.
85 Id. at 1988.
86 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1984.
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STATE SUPREME COURTS

While stare decisis is an important principle of federal judging, state
courts of last resort likewise rely upon the doctrine in their own judicial pronouncements. This Part analyzes how the similarities and differences
between federal and state courts affect, if at all, state court applications of
stare decisis. It is, of course, important to remember that any general claims
about state governments are subject to the caveat that each state is its own
sovereign with its own judicial system. That is, from constitutions to high
courts and beyond, “states” are fundamentally a “them” and not an “it.”
A.

State Supreme Courts Distinguished

State courts of last resort differ from the Supreme Court in many
respects. Those differences are compositional, structural, and functional,
and they affect not only which cases state supreme courts hear but how those
cases are—and ought to be—decided.
The most basic differences are the features of the federal judiciary that
appear on the face of the federal Constitution but are (mostly) not applicable to state judiciaries. For one, Supreme Court Justices enjoy life tenure and
salary protection,90 while “more than eighty-seven percent of state judges go
before the voters at some point in their careers.”91 Moreover, state supreme
court justices are not bound by the jurisdictional restraints of Article III, such
that many states allow their highest court to issue advisory opinions,92 and
state justiciability doctrines are often looser than their federal counterparts.93 As a structural matter, the strict separation of powers lines drawn at
the federal level are often relaxed at the state level, as many state courts are
involved in rulemaking, political questions, and the administration of criminal cases.94
In exercising their judicial function, state courts are bound to follow and
apply federal law and the federal Constitution,95 and they must abide by decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of federal law,96 but they are free to
interpret their own states’ statutes and constitutions as they see fit. The
nature of state constitutions differs markedly from the federal Constitution.
The federal Constitution is a barebone, largely structural framework of government.97 State constitutions, on the other hand, while also establishing
90 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
91 G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
291, 291 (2007).
92 RANDY J. HOLLAND ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE
848–49 (2010).
93 ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 298–99 (2009).
94 See Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 117, 117 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
95 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
96 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 315 (1816).
97 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The Constitution is a framework for government.”).
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the basic structure of state governments, are in-depth, specific documents
that largely focus on limiting the otherwise plenary power of state governments and consequently read more like statutes.98 And unlike the federal
Constitution, which is amended only on the rarest of occasions, state constitutions are amended with relative frequency. From 1776 to 1998, nearly six
thousand amendments to state constitutions were adopted,99 and today in all
but one state, direct electoral approval is required before a constitutional
amendment takes effect.100 Likewise, state legislation is introduced and
enacted at a significantly faster rate than is federal legislation,101 a fact that
some claim is bolstered by the “single subject rule” employed by over forty
states.102 Under that rule, as the name indicates, state legislation can address
only one subject,103 making it easier for state legislatures to address a specific
perceived evil without having to navigate the rocky political waters that
accompany an omnibus bill.104
Moreover, while all state courts have the power of judicial review, the
scope of that review—unlike the federal power, which was not made explicit
until Marbury v. Madison105—is often given in the text of the state constitution.106 But state constitutions can also make state supreme court judicial
review more difficult to exercise. Some state constitutions remove jurisdiction
over certain questions and others require a supermajority vote of the
supreme court before declaring a legislative act unconstitutional.107
98 WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 28.
99 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 24 (1998). State constitutional amendments are adopted in four primary ways: “(1) voter adoption of legislativelyreferred proposals, (2) voter adoption of citizen-initiated proposals, (3) voter adoption of
commission-referred proposals, or (4) through constitutional conventions.” Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 334–35 (2010).
100 WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 26.
101 See John Haughey, 12 Emerging Trends from the 2016 State Legislative Sessions, CQ
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://info.cq.com/resources/12-emerging-trends-from-the-2016-statelegislative-sessions/ (reporting that as of July 2016, states passed 29,122 laws (for an average of 582 per state) while Congress passed only 199); Kevin King, State Legislatures vs.
Congress: Which Is More Productive?, QUORUM, https://www.quorum.us/data-driven-insights/
state-legislatures-versus-congress-which-is-more-productive/176/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2020)
(noting that state legislatures introduce twenty-three times more bills than does Congress).
102 See Working Together to Break the Gridlock, SINGLE SUBJECT AMEND., http://singlesubjectamendment.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (arguing that a single subject amendment
to the federal Constitution “will allow Congress to conduct its business in a more productive, efficient, transparent and less acrimonious way and thereby improve the way Americans view Congress”).
103 Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV.
803, 805 (2006).
104 But see id. at 849–58 (arguing that at least some logrolling is politically beneficial).
105 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
106 WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 288–90.
107 Id. at 289–90.
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Lastly, and most importantly for purposes of this Note, state courts create and develop common law;108 federal courts do not.109 That is, state
courts are common-law courts. Chancellor James Kent defined the common
law as “those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of person and property, which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature.”110
Adopting Kent’s view, the Supreme Court explained that the common law is
“the accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts
to ascertain what is right and just between individuals in respect to private
disputes.”111 Today, state courts continue to decide cases in this commonlaw tradition in two respects.
First, state supreme court justices judge according to the English common-law method: individual cases are decided, and precedent is established
and relied upon in later cases. As discussed above, Blackstone, whose Commentaries educated the first generation of colonial lawyers, taught that judges
did not write the law but merely “discovered” or “declared” the preexisting
general law.112 As more nuanced issues arose and more nuanced “discoveries” were made, a premium was placed on the consistency of past precedents,
all while the common law continued to develop and apply these newfound
legal principles.113 In this manner, “the doctrine of precedent allows for the
evolution of the law,” for as more narrowly tailored precedents are added to
existing authority, the common law “change[s], becoming broader, wider,
deeper, and more articulated.”114 Early state court decisions touted this
“pliant nature”115 of the common law and its ability to “adapt[ ] to [the present] circumstances, state of society[,] and form of government.”116 While
amenable to changing social conditions, state common-law judging necessarily stuck to the doctrine at the heart of the English common law: stare deci108 But see J. Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351,
357–59 (2019) (arguing that the rise in state legislative pronouncements on private law
issues has effectively made American common law a legal fiction). Entrikin seems to make
an empirical claim that as states regulate in fields historically governed by common law,
state courts will have less of an opportunity to develop common law. Id. Entrikin does not
claim, however, that the rise in state legislation over private disputes formally or legally
deprives state courts of their inherent common-law authority. This Note thus assumes that,
no matter the extent to which common-law decisions have been preempted by state legislative pronouncements, state courts retain their common-law nature.
109 But see Friendly, supra note 72, at 405.
110 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 640 (John M. Gould ed., Boston,
Little, Brown & Co., 14th ed. 1896).
111 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
112 See supra note 58–61 and accompanying text.
113 See Lee, supra note 62, at 683, 701.
114 Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 191 (2006).
115 Richard C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies, 30 AM. L.
REG. 553, 559 (1882) (quoting Boyer v. Sweet, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 120, 121 (1841)).
116 Id. at 560 (quoting Lindsley’s Lessee v. Coats, 1 Ohio 243, 245 (1823)).
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sis.117 This steady progression of the common law in state courts of last
resort, rooted in stare decisis, gives credence to Lord Mansfield’s famous
maxim that the common law “works itself pure.”118
Second, every state court, with the exception of Louisiana,119 adopted as
its own law—either through reception statutes or judicial decisions—the
common law of England.120 Thus, the earliest conceptions of the states’ tort,
property, and contract law were imparted from decisions of the King’s
Bench. While state courts continue to develop common-law doctrine in the
manner that English courts did, however, the substance of state common-law
doctrines gradually lost the uniformity enjoyed by the English common
law.121 The earliest state court decisions were considered strong evidence of
the general law in other state courts, but the deference given to such decisions did not bind state courts foreign to the jurisdiction in which the law was
declared.122 The rise of legal positivism in the first half of the twentieth century moreover empowered common-law judges to decide common-law cases
based not upon an answer dictated by an objective, preexisting body of law,
but upon their own understandings of equality and justice.123 Thus, state
court decisions—bolstered by a positivism reinforced by stare decisis—
departed from one shared “common law” and gave rise to forty-nine unique
iterations of the common law in the United States.124
The practice so continues in state courts today. Modern common-law
decisions are based, of course, on precedent—but state court judges must at
times fill in the gaps of their court-created doctrines. Justice Cardozo would
have the common-law judge do so based on “what best serves social welfare
and ‘the [judge’s] sense of justice,’”125 while Judge Posner would have com117 Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6, 17
(1910).
118 Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23; 1 Atk. 22, 33 (argument of Solicitor General Murray, who would later become Lord Mansfield) (emphasis omitted).
119 Dale, supra note 115, at 571.
120 Id. at 569–71. The precise date when the English common law and statutes ceased
to be authoritative law within each state varied by state. Some states drew the line at the
founding of Jamestown in 1607, while others chose July 4, 1776, and others yet chose the
dates they were admitted to the Union. Id. Moreover, many states, in light of the recently
fought Revolutionary War, were reluctant to afford controlling legal weight to English
common law. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 547, 567–68 (1993).
121 Pope, supra note 117, at 17–18.
122 Id. at 7–12.
123 See Charles E. Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law, 17 COLUM. L. REV.
593, 594–96 (1917).
124 See Pope, supra note 117, at 17–18.
125 Edward J. Normand, Damages for Deceit: A Case Study in the Making of American Common Law, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 333, 400 (2016) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921)); see also Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy
in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76 (1928) (noting that Cardozo would have
common-law judges “refer to legal analogy, to legal history, to custom, to the force of
justice, morals, and social welfare”).
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mon-law courts decide on the basis of predictability, efficiency, and wealth
maximization.126 No matter which school a judge favors, and there are many
other schools in between, most judges believe that modern common-law decisions are inevitably based, to some degree, on extralegal considerations—
namely, policy.127 While policy-oriented decisions are disfavored in the textladen world of the federal courts (especially in more formalist interpretive
camps)128 “policy” considerations, whatever form they may take, are the contemporary backbone of common-law judging in state supreme courts.
B.

Stare Decisis in State Supreme Courts

State supreme courts, as common-law courts, occupy a unique space in
our federalist system. The remainder of this Part explores how state supreme
courts’ common-law roots do and ought to shape their articulation and application of stare decisis.
1.

State Court Stare Decisis

Continuing the English common-law practice, all state supreme courts
purport to abide by stare decisis. How the doctrine is articulated, much like
the state-by-state variance in substantive law, likewise varies by state, though
the differences are often subtle and its basic tenet remains consistent
throughout: there is a rebuttable presumption that precedent is to be followed. This relative uniformity makes sense given that stare decisis is itself a
common-law principle—that is, it is common among American courts. Thus, a
brief overview of the federal factors will lay the groundwork for a discussion
of stare decisis as the doctrine is applied in state courts of last resort.
In its most prominent discussion of stare decisis principles, the Supreme
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey129 articulated a number of “prudential
and pragmatic” considerations that it would use to “gauge the respective
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”130 Those factors include
considering whether the precedent is unworkable, whether the precedent’s
continued existence has been reasonably relied upon, whether the evolution
of the law has disturbed the doctrinal foundations of the precedent, and
whether the factual assumptions of the prior decision are no longer applica126 See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 487–88 (1980); Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard
Posner’s Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1302, 1304–05 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)).
127 See Winfield, supra note 125, at 76–77 (observing that Anglo-American common-law
courts necessarily make decisions rooted in “public policy”). But see Caleb Nelson, The
Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2015) (arguing that when
judges “make” law, they should not think of themselves as enacting quasi-legislation, but
should (and do) draw common-law rules from preexisting legal sources).
128 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 261–65 (1990).
129 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
130 Id. at 854.
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ble such that the precedent has little continued justification.131 Curiously, as
one scholar points out, on “the substantive value of interpreting the Constitution correctly,” the Casey Court “said precious little.”132
State court articulations of stare decisis often track this well-rehearsed
federal doctrine. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court considers the
following (similar) factors before overturning a precedent:
(1) “[W]hether the rule has proven to be intolerable because it defies practical workability,” (2) “whether reliance on the rule is such that overruling it
would cause a special hardship and inequity,” (3) “whether upholding the
rule is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests,”
and (4) “whether the prior decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained
departure from precedent.”133

The similarities between the various state court formulations and the federal
doctrine should not be surprising given that many states cite Casey itself when
explaining their stare decisis principles.134 Thus, despite slight differentiations among the states, state courts’ recitations of stare decisis principles
adhere to now-orthodox conceptions of how precedent is to be applied.
Moreover, as an empirical matter, the rate at which state supreme courts
overrule prior decisions is fairly consistent across the states.135 Despite the
big-picture uniformity, however, state supreme courts do not always agree on
131 Id. at 855.
132 Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1876 (2013).
133 McCormick v. Carrier, 795 N.W.2d 517, 535 (Mich. 2010) (quoting Petersen v.
Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Mich. 2009)).
134 See, e.g., Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Alaska 1993);
People v. Novotny, 320 P.3d 1194, 1202 (Colo. 2014); Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d
242, 246 (Conn. 1996); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1109 (Fla. 2004); State v. Garcia, 29
P.3d 919, 925 (Haw. 2001); Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 441 (Md. 2016); State v.
Quintero, 34 A.3d 612, 620 (N.H. 2011); State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 628
N.W.2d 376, 383 (Wis. 2001).
135 For example, from 1885 to 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled itself
on 136 occasions for a rate of 1.19 per term. See Richard B. Cappalli, What Is Authority?
Creation and Use of Case Law by Pennsylvania’s Appellate Courts, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 366
(1999). Likewise, the Iowa Supreme Court overruled 246 cases from 1857 to 2018, for a
rate of 1.53 per term. See Tyler J. Buller & Kelli A. Huser, Stare Decisis in Iowa, 67 DRAKE L.
REV. 317, 338 (2019). And the Wisconsin Supreme Court, from 2008 to 2017, overruled
itself eleven times (out of a total 546 cases heard in that time) for a rate of 1.1 per term.
See Joseph S. Diedrich, The State of Stare Decisis in Wisconsin, WIS. LAW., Nov. 2018, at 30, 32.
At the highest end, from 1999 to 2008, the supreme courts of Alabama, California, and
Michigan overruled their prior decisions sixty-three, thirty-nine, and thirty-four times,
respectively, for a combined average of 5.04 overrulings per term. See Trent B. Collier &
Phillip J. DeRosier, Understanding the Overrulings: A Response to Robert Sedler, 56 WAYNE L.
REV. 1761, 1774 (2010). Other states overrule cases at a similar rate as those mentioned.
See Allen Lanstra, Jr., Does Judicial Selection Method Affect Volatility?: A Comparative Study of
Precedent Adherence in Elected State Supreme Courts and Appointed State Supreme Courts, 31 SW. U.
L. REV. 35, 67–69 (2001). Moreover, whether state supreme court justices are appointed or
elected has no statistically significant bearing on how likely a given court is to overturn
precedent. Id. at 69.
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the finer aspects of stare decisis. States that have explicitly considered the
issue vary on how to conceptualize stare decisis principles within the state
constitutional, statutory, and common-law contexts.136
2.

Methodological Stare Decisis

The above discussion raises the question: What precedential effect, if
any, do the Casey factors—or the various state court variations on the
theme—have on future courts? That is, is a court’s doctrinal formulation of
stare decisis itself a precedent?137 While stare decisis typically attaches to substantive legal issues, its force in the realm of legal methodology is less clear, at
least at the federal level.138 Some commentators have observed that when it
comes to statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court picks and chooses
when to adhere to the methods by which it reached a prior textual interpretation.139 Moreover, the federal Constitution is silent on stare decisis, and no
legislation directs the Court to use precedent in a specified manner.140
136 Compare Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co., 445 P.3d 474, 510 n.10 (Utah
2019) (Lee, J., dissenting) (“This court has only ever applied a single, uniform standard.
In statutory, common law, constitutional, and other cases we have consistently inquired
into the same [stare decisis] considerations . . . .”), and Farmers Ins. Co. of Or. v. Mowry,
261 P.3d 1, 7–8 (Or. 2011) (en banc) (“In applying stare decisis to decisions construing
statutes, we will rely upon the same considerations we do in constitutional and commonlaw cases, although, as noted, the weight given to particular considerations will not necessarily be the same.”), with People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 902 (N.Y. 1976) (“Precedents
involving statutory interpretation are entitled to great stability . . . . [I]f the precedent or
precedents have ‘misinterpreted’ the legislative intention, the Legislature’s competency to
correct the ‘misinterpretation’ is readily at hand.”), and City of Rocky River v. State Emp’t
Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103, 108 (Ohio 1989) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is less
important in the constitutional context than in cases of either pure judge-made law or
statutory interpretation.”).
137 Professor Paulsen has taken up the normative aspect of this question in regard to
the Supreme Court’s application of stare decisis and has concluded, ironically, that the
justification the Court gives for stare decisis does not itself justify its continued use as the
doctrine is currently applied. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current
Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2008).
138 Compare Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of
Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 714 (2008) (noting
that the Supreme Court varies in the consistent use of statutory interpretation methodologies), with Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1754 (2010) (noting that
many state courts of last resort use “[m]ethodological stare decisis” in which rules of interpretation themselves become binding precedent).
139 See Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Pluralism and Constitutional Interpretation, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 32–39 (2014); Connors, supra note 138, at 696–708.
140 Query whether Congress could do so without violating separation of powers principles. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1567–99 (2000) (arguing that such
a law would lie within Congress’s necessary and proper powers and would not infringe
upon Article III’s case-deciding function).
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Given that stare decisis is self-promulgated and self-policed, how the federal
doctrine is framed and applied depends, to a certain extent, on who writes
the opinion.141
Is there a better way? One that state supreme courts, given their unique
status as common-law courts, could and perhaps should implement? Because
the goals of stare decisis include encouraging stability in the law and fostering the courts’ institutional legitimacy, a consistent framing and application
of the doctrine, at least within each jurisdiction, seems like desirable doctrinal development. If state supreme courts were required by law to articulate
and apply their stare decisis rules in a predetermined fashion, as if the rules
were agreed upon in a legal vacuum disconnected from any immediate case
or controversy, then judicial majorities would have less leniency in disrupting
the force with which precedent is applied to reach desirable policy outcomes—an oft-alluded-to critique of the Supreme Court’s own stare decisis
applications.142 Moreover, state supreme courts are no strangers to giving
precedential effect to not only the “what” of prior decisions but also to the
“how.”
State courts of last resort, to varying degrees, adhere to so-called “methodological stare decisis.” When a judicial “subdecision”—i.e., the methodology by which a prior decision was reached—is not followed, the natural
progression of the law faces uncertainty.143 To rectify this problem, every
state has legislatively enacted certain rules of interpretation, and some state
supreme courts have further bound themselves by adhering to interpretive
norms promulgated via court decisions.144 Typically, this methodological
stare decisis attaches to rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation.145
For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court announced in State v.
Courchesne that it would no longer follow the “plain meaning rule” for inter141 Compare Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2478–79 (2018) (Alito, J., for the Court) (“[A]s we have often recognized, stare decisis
is ‘not an inexorable command.’ . . . An important factor in determining whether a precedent should be overruled is the quality of its reasoning . . . .” (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009))), with Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036
(2014) (Kagan, J., for the Court) (“[T]his Court does not overturn its precedents
lightly. . . . [S]tare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of law, necessary to ensure that
legal rules develop ‘in a principled and intelligible fashion’ . . . .” (quoting Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986))).
142 See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1988 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The true irony of our modern stare decisis doctrine lies in the fact that proponents
of stare decisis tend to invoke it most fervently when the precedent at issue is least defensible.”); William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis:
Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 105;
Silver & Kozlowski, supra note 3, at 42–43.
143 See Connors, supra note 138, at 709 (arguing that a consistent methodology would
promote judicial consistency and efficiency).
144 Gluck, supra note 138, at 1754. Professor Gluck specifically studied the methodological stare decisis of Oregon, Connecticut, Texas, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Id. at 1771.
145 Id. at 1814.
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preting statutes.146 In less than a year, however, the Connecticut legislature
overrode that decision via statute and prohibited consideration of any
“extratextual evidence” in statutory interpretation, unless the statute is
ambiguous or a plain reading would produce absurd results.147 In the years
following the legislative override, the Connecticut Supreme Court resisted
applying the statute with much vigor,148 but this rulemaking back and forth
(a common feature among states that take seriously methodological stare
decisis)149 has not destroyed the court’s interpretive consistency. To the contrary, the caselaw elucidating the interpretive guidance statute has developed
in such a way that litigants now know how the Connecticut Supreme Court
will interpret statutes before it.150 And in Wisconsin, where the most prominent rules of statutory interpretation are almost exclusively judge made, the
experiment has likewise bred more consistent interpretations:
Indeed, despite the fact that several of the Wisconsin justices disfavor the
more restrictive approach to legislative history that [the current test]
imposes, what may be most significant is that most of the court’s disputes are
about how the . . . framework should be applied, not whether it controls.151

Rules of statutory interpretation are thus a means to an end—namely, elucidating the meaning of an ambiguous statute. But is stare decisis a similar
means to a similar end? Or is it an end in itself?
Stare decisis is arguably methodological. It does not prescribe what a
court should decide but rather how it ought to decide152: instead of starting a
legal inquiry from scratch, a court is to rely upon and apply past decisions,
but not always. While drawing distinctions that parallel the substance-procedure line is impossible to fully expound,153 there is a strong case to be made
146 State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 578, 582 (Conn. 2003).
147 Gluck, supra note 138, at 1792 (citing 2003 Conn. Acts 154 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2019)).
148 Id. at 1794.
149 Id. at 1776–97 (recounting similar interactions between the state legislatures and
supreme courts of Oregon and Texas).
150 Id. at 1794–95 (“The court has continued to cite favorably to Courchesne . . . so long
as the statutory text is ambiguous. . . . [A]s long as the parties are arguing over statutory
meaning, as litigating parties are likely to do, the Connecticut Supreme Court finds the
text ambiguous and holds [the statutory override] inapplicable.”).
151 Id. at 1799–1802. Moreover, of the eighteen statutory interpretation cases decided
after the interpretive rules were adopted that were based upon the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s interpretive rules, the justices who initially disagreed with the rules “in only one [of
those] case[s] wrote to object generally to the lack of a more eclectic approach.” Id. at
1802–03.
152 See DANIEL CHANDLER & ROD MUNDAY, A DICTIONARY OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION
276 (2011) (defining “methodology” as “[t]he philosophical evaluation of how . . . [an]
inquiry [is] framed” (emphasis added)).
153 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“The line between ‘substance’
and ‘procedure’ shifts as the legal context changes.”); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural
Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 841 (2010) (arguing that not only is
procedural law inherently substantive but that substantive law is inherently procedural).
But see Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L.
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that stare decisis is methodological because it principally serves as a “particular action-guiding legal norm[ ].”154 But even if stare decisis were substantive
or “outcome-determinative,”155 state courts announce and adhere to substantive precedents all the time! Indeed, stare decisis emerged from the common law not as a procedural tool but as a substantive necessity for comparing
and applying a previously decided case to a presently considered one. Thus,
there seems to be no principled reason that the rules governing a court’s
adherence to stare decisis should not enjoy the same doctrinal certainty that
methods of statutory interpretation and substantive common-law rules themselves enjoy in state courts of last resort.156
Given that this proposed methodological stare decisis for stare decisis is
(a) legally desirable and (b) legally possible, state courts of last resort, to the
extent they do not already, should consider adopting it in both their statutory and constitutional interpretation and common-law capacities.157 How
the stare decisis rules are to be formulated within this methodological framework, however, is context dependent and is explored in detail below.
III. WHAT STATE SUPREME COURTS CAN LEARN

FROM

GAMBLE

Common-law judging is a fundamentally different exercise of the judicial power than is constitutional or statutory interpretation. In the former,
judges are the first and final decisionmakers, while in the latter, judges are
famously to exercise “neither force nor will[,] but merely judgment” as to
what a democratically enacted text means.158 In both contexts, judges use
precedent to inform how a present case is to be decided.
My overall claim is a modest one: the unique judicial power that state
courts of last resort exercise in each context requires unique, context-dependent stare decisis principles. More specifically, for constitutional and statutory interpretations, state supreme courts should adopt Justice Thomas’s
textually driven theory of stare decisis that he laid out in his Gamble concurrence. For common-law decisions, state supreme courts should be informed
by the common-law principles expounded in Gamble but must ultimately
REV. 103, 107 (2011) (defending the substance-procedure distinction); Lawrence B.
Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 225 (2004) (attempting to distinguish
substance and procedure and positing that “the real work of procedure is to provide particular action-guiding legal norms”).
154 Solum, supra note 153, at 225 (defining “procedure”).
155 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (suggesting that a rule is
substantive where the rule determines the outcome of a case).
156 I do not wish to suggest, however, that all states should necessarily adopt the same
stare decisis formulation, at least in the common-law context. See infra Section III.B.
157 But cf. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 108 (2003) (arguing against
congressionally enacted, mandatory rules of statutory construction).
158 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted); see also id. at 467 (“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and
peculiar province of the courts.”).
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depart from Justice Thomas’s theory in favor of more traditional stare decisis
considerations.
A.

State Constitutional and Statutory Stare Decisis159

Recall that the common-law conception of the “judicial power,” upon
which Justice Thomas bases his theory, obliged a judge to get the case
“right.”160 And “right” legal answers were possible because common-law
judges did not invent law but—either correctly or mistakenly—discovered
the general law.161 If a precedent was correctly decided, even arguably so,
common-law judges upheld it; if it was obviously mistaken—i.e., contrary to
divine law—the precedent would be overturned. While that conception has
largely been abandoned, it is no less true today than it was in 1789 that certain legal questions have objectively “right” answers.
Such is the case for the interpretation of constitutions and statutes.
Either a precedent comports with the text of the instrument or it does not.
For Justice Thomas, when a prior interpretation is “demonstrably erroneous,” a court’s exercise of the judicial power—that is, the power to say what
the law is—requires that it do just that: faithfully say what the law is, contrary
precedent notwithstanding.162 To elevate the doctrine of stare decisis over
this key function of the judicial power is to aggrandize the judicial role. No
amount of legislative acquiescence (for those who believe in it) can save an
interpretation that departs from a permissible reading of the text from being
legislative in function. If the legislature did not enact via statute or the people themselves through constitutional amendment the rule that an impermissible interpretation advances, then the judiciary, through its erroneous
interpretation, must have. As a matter of history and separation of powers, in
accordance with the doctrinal underpinning of the judicial power, such interpretations cannot stand—and stare decisis must not serve as a barrier to faithful exercises of the judicial power when said power requires that precedent
be abandoned.
State supreme courts, when they exercise their judicial power as
expounders of constitutions and statutes, are no less bound by the text than
is the federal judiciary. As some commentators have pointed out, however,
“[t]he ‘judicial power’ is not monolithic.”163 Textually and historically, it
159 This Note is limited to state court stare decisis principles for state constitutional and
statutory interpretations and leaves for another day state court stare decisis principles in
regard to the interpretation of the federal Constitution and federal statutes and
regulations. While the main arguments in favor of a textually driven stare decisis hold true
when it comes to the interpretation of federal texts, the arguments that states are even
better forums for the theory are not necessarily applicable when it comes to interpreting
federal texts.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 59–64.
161 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
162 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
163 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1239 (2012).
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would be unfair to assume that each state’s judicial power, so conferred by
each state’s constitution, tracks that vested in the federal courts by Article
III.164 But the differences that these commentators raise—many of which I
highlight above165—do not affect the core of the judicial power that state
and federal courts exercise when it comes to the interpretation of constitutions and statutes. No state supreme court would seriously contest the notion
that the “general concept of judicial power” includes the fair interpretation
of democratically enacted texts.166 To the extent that the judicial power varies between federal courts and state courts, state courts exercise greater judicial power, not less,167 which necessarily leaves intact the textual
interpretation function state courts have in common with the federal courts.
Thus, Justice Thomas’s arguments about what the “judicial power” requires
of the federal judiciary likewise apply to state judiciaries, at least when it
comes to interpreting constitutions and statutes.
Justice Thomas’s approach to stare decisis might not garner doctrinal
acceptance in the Supreme Court, but that does not mean that state courts of
last resort should not adopt it. The theory is defensible on its own terms: it
comports with a judge’s judicial duty and is true to the text of the democratically enacted instrument under judicial review. There are, however, even
stronger arguments for the theory’s applicability in state supreme courts than
there are for its usage by the Supreme Court. While this textually rigorous
approach to stare decisis for constitutional and statutory interpretations is
convincing in its own right, the distinct nature of state constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries points to at least four reasons that state supreme courts
should adopt Justice Thomas’s theory, even if the Supreme Court ultimately
does not.
First, the frequency with which state constitutions are amended, combined with the fact that direct voter approval is needed to pass a state constitutional amendment, gives modern voters far greater control over their state
constitutions than they have over the federal Constitution. While none of us
had a say at Philadelphia in 1787, we the people have made some momentous changes to the liberties recognized by and the obligations of our state
governments in recent years via popular votes to amend our state constitutions.168 At least some defenses of living constitutionalism home in on this
point: the people today should develop a contemporary meaning of the Constitution to retain the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy and avoid dead164 Id.
165 See supra Section II.A.
166 WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 287, 298.
167 Id. at 287–88.
168 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.06 (adopted 2018) (recognizing the “sanctity of
unborn life” and extending legal rights to unborn children); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII,
§ 16(1)(a) (adopted 2012) (legalizing recreational marijuana use); FLA. CONST. art. III,
§ 20(a) (adopted 2010) (prohibiting political gerrymandering); N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2(4)
(adopted 2018) (requiring that voters show photo identification at polls).
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hand control.169 Given the people’s frequent and direct control over state
constitutions, however, the state courts’ role in giving modern society a voice
in state constitutional interpretation is limited at best.170 If the text of a state
constitution no longer comports with contemporary social mores or political
necessities, the people can simply change the text themselves—but this reality goes beyond the practical to the philosophical. When the people do
amend their state constitution, it really is the people, as opposed to their
elected representatives, who make the constitutional change.171 In light of
these practical and philosophical realities, the role of a state court judge in
interpreting a state constitution is to give effect to the text that was enacted,
regardless of what prior interpretations have decided. If a precedent is not a
textually permissible reading of the constitutional provision, the state
supreme court must not give it precedential treatment. To do so would see
that court exceed the bounds of its judicial power by imparting on the state’s
constitution a meaning that was not endorsed by the people of the state.
Second, the nature of state constitutions themselves call for a more formalist interpretive methodology, and thus a more text-based stare decisis,
than does the federal Constitution. For one, the specific and “overelaborate
detail[ ]” with which state constitutions are written suggests “a built-in orientation toward strict construction”172—i.e., textual analysis. Moreover, the
length and specificity of state constitutions derives from the fact that—unlike
the federal Constitution—state constitutions do not grant the government
enumerated powers but rather limit the otherwise plenary power of the
state.173 Thus, courts can and must be particularly attentive to the limitations placed upon the states’ exercises of their sovereign power. Thirty state
constitutions contain over twenty thousand words, which, as one commentator put it, “offer[s] textualists a lot of text to interpret.”174 For stare decisis,
this means that prior demonstrably erroneous interpretations, especially
those that do not accurately limit the state’s power according to the constitution’s text, deprive the people of their agreed-upon choice to limit certain
aspects of the state’s otherwise plenary sovereign power. There is perhaps no
169 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1755–57
(2007); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
353, 358–59 (2007); Richard A Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 165, 196–97 (2008).
170 Even in states where the constitution specifies that constitutional construction must
give weight to the intent of the people, see WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 315–18, the intent
of the people can be gleaned from the text and history of the provision under review.
None of the examples cited by Williams suggest that Justice Thomas’s interpretive
approach is inconsistent with these states’ constitutional construction clauses.
171 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
172 William F. Swindler, State Constitutions for the 20th Century, 50 NEB. L. REV. 577,
593–94 (1971); see also G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Design and State Constitutional Interpretation, 72 MONT. L. REV. 7, 9–12 (2011) (arguing that the distinctive nature of state
constitutions requires that they be interpreted based on text and original meaning).
173 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
174 Tarr, supra note 172, at 13.
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other context in which getting the answer “right,” as opposed to upholding
erroneous interpretations for the sake of adhering to precedent, is as significant for state courts of last resort.175
Third, the relative frequency with which state constitutions are amended
is analogous to the relative frequency with which state legislation is passed.
Similar to the state constitutional amendment process, the people have real
recourse in their state legislative process—bolstered by the “single subject
rule”—to repeal an unwanted law or pass a desirable one.176 While state
legislation is not subject to direct popular approval, as constitutional amendments are, state legislators represent more discrete electorates177 and usually
face elections more often than their federal counterparts do,178 giving the
people, at least in theory, greater control over state legislation than they have
at the federal level. These features of the state legislative process, contrary to
the view of one prominent federal jurist, eliminate any need for state court
judges to judicially update state statutes that have potentially fallen out of
modern favor.179 Rather, state courts of last resort can be assured that deciding a statutory question consistent with the text not only comports with their
judicial duty but likewise leaves open the real possibility that the underlying
law is subject to change through the democratic process if the people disagree with its merits. In this way, this “[i]nterpretive formalism” is “an extension of the common law tradition in its respect for compromise, modest
aspirations for coherence, and its preference for normative salience over
abstract moral vision.”180 State courts that employ a text-based stare decisis
doctrine leave abstract debates over such moral predilections to the branch
in which they are legally committed and in which the people may rightfully
participate: the legislature.181
To be clear, some who argue for “super-strong” stare decisis for statutory
interpretations make an argument that has a similar ring to the preceding
175 Civil liberties, which are arguably the most precious rights protected by courts, are
adjudicated based on whether the state’s exercise of its sovereign power was lawful—a
power limited by the text of the state constitution.
176 See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
177 2010 Constituents Per State: Legislative District Table, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/2010-constituents-per-state-legislative-district.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (the average U.S. Congress member represents
709,760 constituents, while state House members represent anywhere from 465,674 constituents (California) to as few as 3291 constituents (New Hampshire)).
178 See Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Aug. 9, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-and-length-of-terms.aspx.
179 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 353 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (advocating that federal judges ought to undertake “judicial interpretive
updating” for statutory interpretations).
180 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV.
1357, 1415 (2015).
181 But see Eskridge, supra note 43, at 1407 (arguing that leaving controversial decisions
to Congress does not work because Congress drafts broad statutes, letting the courts make
politically unpopular decisions).
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argument.182 Such commentators argue that once a court renders an interpretation, whether textually permissible or not, the legislature may correct it
by enacting another statute. Thus, so goes the argument, the court must
uphold even its textually impermissible precedents because the legislature
can always correct the interpretation if it so desires; if the legislature does not
act, it acquiesces in the interpretation.183 But this argument misses the
point. The legislature expressed its will in the text of the statute the first time
around. That the burden shifts to the legislature to correct the courts’ erroneous interpretation of one of its statutes seems indefensible,184 especially in
light of the court’s judicial power. Additionally, it is unclear why a later legislature, one that did not enact the statute under review, is a more salient body
to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statute than are the courts—
which, it bears repeating, exclusively enjoy the judicial power to “say what the
law is.”185 While these arguments could apply at the state or federal level, the
relative pace at which state legislation is enacted and the more discrete constituencies represented by state lawmakers again bolsters the case for a textbased stare decisis in state supreme courts.
Fourth, the (often) unequal distribution of power among the state
branches of government requires greater judicial deference to state legislatures than is owed by federal judges to Congress. During the Founding era,
state constitutions “tended to exalt legislative power at the expense of the
executive and the judiciary.”186 And while attempts to curb such legislative
dominance persist,187 it remains true that “[s]tate legislative power is plenary, whereas federal legislative power is enumerated.”188 The disparate
placement of power in state legislatures calls for heightened judicial deference to state legislatures when it comes to statutory interpretation—and this
deference affects the role that stare decisis should play for statutory questions.189 Consider a judge who is faced with deciding whether to uphold an
incorrect interpretive precedent or to correct that error by rendering a deci182 See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
183 Eskridge, supra note 43, at 1366–67.
184 Professor Eskridge has made a similar observation. Id. at 1403.
185 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
186 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 21 (1972);
see also Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 911, 916 (1993) (“The powers and prerogatives taken from the governors
were given to the legislatures, marking a revolutionary shift in the traditional responsibility
of government.”).
187 WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 236.
188 Robert F. Williams, Rhode Island’s Distribution of Powers Question of the Century: Reverse
Delegation and Implied Limits on Legislative Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 159, 163
(1998).
189 “Deference,” as used here, should not be confused with overbreadth. Deference to
the legislature requires that reviewing courts give effect to the text that the legislature has
enacted. Admittedly, tension exists between the notion that that state legislatures deserve
deference when reviewing courts undertake textually based statutory interpretations and
the notion that because states have plenary legislative authority, state courts must use a
textually rigorous methodology for constitutional interpretations. The two are reconcila-
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sion that is a permissible interpretation of the text of the statute. Given its
current practice, the Supreme Court would not worry too greatly about
affirming such a precedent.190 But Justice Thomas argues that to do so
would be more akin to lawmaking than it would be to law deciding.191 At the
state level, where judges must be particularly attentive to legislative dominance, judges must stray far away from lawmaking unless they are exercising
their common-law powers. This requires that state court judges overturn statutory interpretations where the precedent presents an impermissible interpretation of the text, stare decisis notwithstanding. This interpretive
deference remains intact when state legislatures regulate in fields historically
occupied by judge-made common law; state judges retain common-law powers over certain doctrines until it is democratically displaced from judicial
authority, at which time the statutory text, and not judicial precedents, must
control as it otherwise would. Importantly, such legislative preemption does
not destroy the common law but merely shifts it “from courts to legislatures[,] and the concomitant judicial deference to reasonably clear statutory
formality . . . [i]s a natural development in the common law tradition, not a
rupture.”192
Practically, this text-based approach to stare decisis does not render all
interpretive precedents obsolete, and it is not an invitation for judges to consider anew every interpretive question that comes before them. Rather, stare
decisis still requires that judges start their analysis by considering prior decisions. If a prior interpretation comports with the text but the sitting court
disagrees with the nuances of the prior interpretation, the court may invoke
stare decisis to uphold that interpretation. Where it can be shown, however,
that a prior decision was demonstrably erroneous, the court can—and in fact
must, in accordance with its judicial duty—overturn the precedent and
render a textually permissible interpretation.193 To the extent that “reliance” should be a stare decisis consideration for statutory and constitutional
precedents,194 this approach provides a baseline for future litigants to reasonably predict when a prior interpretation is likely to be upheld, which
would additionally assist would-be litigants in deciding whether to challenge
a precedent in the first place. As Justice Thomas put it, “if we replaced our
malleable balancing test with a clear, principled rule grounded in the meanble, however, if the state court applies a consistent brand of textualism for its statutory and
constitutional interpretations.
190 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. For Justice Thomas, when it comes to the
Constitution, because it “is supreme over other sources of law, it requires us to privilege its
text over our own precedents when the two are in conflict.” Gamble v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 1960, 1985 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
192 Pojanowski, supra note 180, at 1416.
193 For a historical perspective on this argument, see Nelson, supra note 83, at 8–52.
194 See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1470–85 (2013) (questioning the utility of backward-looking reliance interests as a stare decisis consideration).
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ing of the text,” this “would eliminate a significant amount of uncertainty and
provide the very stability sought.”195
One paradoxical consequence of adhering to the proffered approach at
the state level is worth mentioning. If a state were to pass a constitutional
amendment that required its supreme court to employ a dynamic interpretive methodology, that court would have to interpret its state’s statutes and
constitution in that light.196 Ironically, then, a textualist judge would be text
bound (and duty bound via the constitutional provision) to dynamically
update the statutory and constitutional provisions under judicial review. The
stare decisis implication is that when considering whether a precedent is
demonstrably erroneous, a judge in such a jurisdiction would not ask
whether the prior interpretation is textually permissible and falls within the
“range of indeterminacy.”197 Instead, such a judge would consider whether
the prior interpretation comports with contemporary legal and social norms,
or whether the prior interpretation is otherwise in accordance with the
requirements of the constitutional provision that established the interpretive
norm. While the stare decisis approach advanced herein favors an originalist
and textualist interpretive baseline, essential to any conception of the judicial
power is the idea that judges themselves must follow the law. This necessarily
includes judging in accordance with the requirements of a written constitution198—constitutionally prescribed interpretive methodologies included.
*

*

*

In sum, the judicial power exercised by state supreme court justices
requires that they employ judgment and not will by interpreting state constitutions and statutes according to the democratically enacted text before
them. Where adhering to precedent would render a textually impermissible
interpretation, stare decisis must yield. Judicial deference to the text and
ultimately to the state legislature, as opposed to prior indefensible interpretations, is especially salient at the state level, where the people have a real
opportunity to influence their state constitution and legislation. In light of
the above arguments, Justice Thomas’s summary of his stare decisis thesis is
worth repeating: “When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent, my
rule is simple: We should not follow it.”199
195 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1988.
196 See People v. Mezy, 551 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Mich. 1996) (laying down, by judicial
decision, the interpretive baseline that the Michigan Supreme Court is to construe the
Michigan constitution by giving it the meaning “the great mass of the people themselves[ ]
would give it” (quoting People v. Nash, 341 N.W.2d 439, 443 (Mich. 1983))).
197 Nelson, supra note 83, at 7.
198 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Certainly all those who
have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation . . . .”).
199 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1984.
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Common-Law Stare Decisis

Without a text in which to ground their decisions, state supreme courts
need a different stare decisis framework for their common-law precedents.
Unlike some courts and commentators, I do not propose that common-law
precedents are owed a certain “weight” in relation to the constitutional and
statutory framework described above. The view of the Supreme Court is that
“[c]ommon law precedents enjoy a strong presumption of correctness,” while
this presumption for constitutional precedents is weaker and the presumption for statutory precedents is “super-strong.”200 There is nothing wrong
with affording common-law precedents a strong presumption of correctness—indeed, there should be such a presumption. It was and continues to
be precisely that strong presumption that fosters the steady progression of
common-law doctrines and well-founded reliance on previous common-law
decisions. Even Justice Thomas concedes that the Supreme Court’s requirement of a “special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided”201 to overrule a precedent “might have made sense in a
common-law legal system in which courts systematically developed the law
through judicial decisions apart from written law.”202 But I remain skeptical
that taxonomizing the weight of common-law precedents in relation to statutory and constitutional precedents is the best doctrinal conceptualization for
this very reason: common-law stare decisis is different in kind, not merely in
degree, from statutory and constitutional stare decisis. At least it should be.
Stare decisis grew up in the common-law tradition. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the modern stare decisis formulations employed by
state courts of last resort are better suited for the common-law context than
they are for the statutory and constitutional interpretation contexts. I do not
wish here to propose specific stare decisis factors that state supreme courts
should adopt because—like the American common-law experience itself—
there are many defensible articulations that could further the purposes of
the common law, and in so doing, further a more just or more efficient society (or both).203 For example, Michigan’s doctrine, which emphasizes workability, reliance, public interest, and reasoning of the prior decision,204 is a
widely agreed-upon stare decisis formulation. But that is not to say that a
state like Wisconsin, which additionally considers “whether [the precedent]
has produced a settled body of law” and explicitly disavows looking at
whether a large majority of other states have decided similar questions con200 Eskridge, supra note 43, at 1362. As Section III.A demonstrates, I likewise reject the
idea that statutory and constitutional precedents should be afforded differing stare decisis
“weight,” at least at the state level.
201 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 864 (1992)).
202 Id. at 1981–82.
203 See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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trary to the Wisconsin Supreme Court,205 are not likewise legitimate common-law stare decisis factors.
An additional benefit of a nonuniform approach to common-law stare
decisis among states is that it preserves the states’ unique place in the federalist structure as “laboratories of democracy.”206 Each state may adopt its own
common-law stare decisis principles and then learn not only from its own
experiences but from the experiences of its sister states. And is that not the
beauty of the common law in the first place? The possibility that, as generations come and go, as more complex lawsuits are initiated, and as community
values themselves evolve, our legal doctrines—stare decisis included—might
adapt so as to heed the changing legal and moral landscape?207
One small caveat: to allow for the state-by-state development of commonlaw stare decisis factors is not to endorse stare decisis relativism. Certain stare
decisis principles, especially within the common-law context, must remain
true. While its finer points are subject to debate among the states, stare decisis remains a “very good maxim” that all state supreme courts abide by and is
rooted in a rich history that cannot be ignored wholesale.208 At a bare minimum, common-law stare decisis requires the strong presumption that a prior
decision is to be upheld. Indeed, this presumption is what “keep[s] the scale
of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s
opinion.”209
CONCLUSION
The textually grounded approach to stare decisis that Justice Thomas
laid out in his concurrence in Gamble is not likely to be adopted by the
Supreme Court anytime soon. But the merits of his position can—and, as
this Note argues, should—garner the attention and adherence of state
supreme courts. When it comes to state statutory and constitutional interpretations, the distinct role that state courts of last resort and the state-level
instruments they interpret play in our federalist system requires a conception
of stare decisis that is distinct from that of the federal Supreme Court—a
stare decisis doctrine that is indubitably rooted in the text to avoid usurping
205 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d 257, 287–88 (Wis.
2003).
206 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
207 Advocating a uniform—that is, textual—stare decisis for state supreme courts in no
way undermines this “states as laboratories” argument in the common-law context. State
legislatures act as the “laboratories” when enacting statutes that surely vary by state, whereas
courts themselves are the source of differing common-law doctrines. Therefore, even if all
states adopted Justice Thomas’s approach to stare decisis for statutory and constitutional
precedents, the resulting interpretations would produce substantive variance among the
states because his approach requires adherence to the text of the statute or constitution,
which are necessarily state specific.
208 Parker v. Drew (1754) 96 Eng. Rep. 935, 936; 1 Keny. 114, 117.
209 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *69.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL411.txt

1762

unknown

Seq: 32

notre dame law review

3-MAY-20

15:25

[vol. 95:4

the constitutional and statutory decisions of the people.210 And when state
courts of last resort develop common law—another facet unique to state
supreme courts—they ought to afford judicial precedents the common-law
presumption of correctness, and where necessary, develop the finer aspects
of the doctrine in the common-law tradition that gave rise to stare decisis in
the first place. As Justice Thomas notes, “the common law was based in the
collective, systematic development of the law through reason.”211 The statecourt-specific, textually grounded view of stare decisis advanced in this Note
may be a next, reasonable step in that development.

210 See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1985 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“In sum, my view of stare decisis requires adherence to decisions made by the People—that
is, to the original understanding of the relevant legal text—which may not align with decisions made by the Court.”).
211 Id. at 1983.

